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eBook details

• Title: Aristotelian Hylomorphism and Non-Reductive Materialism (Report)
• Author : APIERON
• Release Date : January 01, 2008
• Genre: Religion & Spirituality,Books,
• Pages : * pages
• Size : 223 KB

Description

I Introduction Contemporary metaphysicians have agreed on very little when it comes to the nature of persons. Perhaps closest to a philosophical consensus is the claim 'I exist' for each person who considers it. Thus, a piece of the Cartesian legacy remains. However, Descartes' attempt at spelling out an answer to the 'What sort of thing am I?' question has received almost the opposite reception as defenders of substance dualism have become scarce. So, there are some (or at least one) persons and these are closely linked with the physical. This link is explicated in a variety of ways, e.g., emergence, supervenience, constitution, animalism, etc. The non-reductive materialist views are most popular as they are the only ones that pay proper homage to the Cartesian insight (I exist.) without being laden with the burden of dualism. Fortunately, philosophers have not rested content with the Cartesian argument (thanks, in part, to those like Hume, Russell, and Unger who reject the view) and have sought to explain why there is something where I am. Or, to put it a bit more descriptively, if there were a bunch of Lego bricks put together in the shape of a human, we would not think there was anything of ontological significance over and above the individual Lego bricks, (1) but the thing that is where my parts are arranged like a person is something over and above the parts (this is where the 'non' in 'non-reductive materialism' does its work), so, how does the one human-shaped thing differ from the other in such a way that one is reducible to its parts and the other is not? The most popular answer (or type of answer) to this question appeals to considerations of internally caused and maintained structure. If a child removes some of the Lego bricks from the person-shaped structure (call it Sid), Sid cannot repair, replace, or otherwise deal with this event. Sid is entirely dependent on external circumstances to be the sort of structure it is. My human-shaped structure, though in need of favorable circumstances, is capable of reacting to such situations in order to maintain the sort of structure that is in place. It is this internal source of organization and structure that sets me apart from Sid.

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